A DEFENSE OF THE "ZONE OF INTERESTS"
STANDING TEST
Standing tests prevent abuse of the judicial process while
providing citizens pursuing good faith claims with access to the courts.'
Preventing abuse of the judicial process and ensuring court access are
the "prudential" concerns of standing tests.2 Because these concerns
may take different forms depending on the type of suit before a court,
"[t]he various rules of standing applied in the federal courts... have
been fashioned with specific reference to the status asserted by the
party whose standing is challenged and to the type of question he
wishes to have adjudicated." 3 Put another way, all standing tests start
with Article IIrs case or controversy requirement-the nonprudential
concern of standing-but they "do not necessarily track one another"
beyond this constitutional requirement. 4 In short, prudential standing
tests are context-dependent. Thus specific standing tests incorporate
1. See, ag., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Belwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979);
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 (1974). For a list of relevant
secondary sources see Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
SurrogateforClaimforRelif, 83 YALE U.. 425, 425 nn.l&2 (1974).

Tests to determine standing to challenge administrative action in federal courts, such as the
zone ofinterests test, also promote the separation of powers. See; ag., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
I00-01 (1967); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 139-40 (D.C. Cir.), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1977).
2. Although Article 1is standing requirements must be met before a complainant may
invoke the judicial power, nonconstitutional limitations on standing are prudential rules of selfrestraint to be applied in appropriate circumstances. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 100 n.6 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501 (1975).
In administrative cases, as well as in other cases, it is often difficult to distinguish the standing
requirement from the requirement that the plaintiff state a cause of action. The best explanation
of the distinction is found in Warth v. Seldin, id at 500-01. See infra note 109 and accompanying
text; see also infra note 78.
3. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
4. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). The
meaning of Article Ills case or controversy requirement is beyond the scope of this note. For an
in-depth analysis of Article Us standing requirement see 3. RADcLIFFE, THE CAsE-ORCONTROVERSY IROVIsioN (1978); see also Brilmayer, A Reply, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1727 (1980);
Brilmayer, The Judpnidence of Article l" Perpectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979); Lebel, Standing after Havens Realty. A Critiqueand
an Alterntative FrameworkfrAnalysis, 1982 DuKE L.i. 1013; Tushnet, The Sociology of Article
II1 A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARv. L REv. 1698 (1980); infra note 136 and
accompanying text.
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different nonconstitutional requirements to facilitate consideration of

prudential policy concerns in a given context.5
The Supreme Court has not, however, provided guidelines for
application of specific standing tests.6 As a result, lower courts often
apply the tests inconsistently. The "zone of interests" test, used to
determine standing to challenge certain administrative actions,7 has
caused particular problems since its inception.8 Courts have blindly
applied the test, confused the contexts in which it applies, and distorted

its method of application, causing several critics to call for the
abandonment of the test.
This note defends the zone of interests test. The note first traces
the origin and development of the test. It then presents the major
criticisms of the test and the suggested alternatives. Finally, the note
responds to these criticisms and-suggested alternatives. It concludes
that, when properly applied, the zone of interests test effectively limits
standing issues to threshold inquiries while preserving the courts'
5. This note analyzes the zone ofinterests standing test as it has been developed and applied
in administrative law, it does not survey all federal standing tests or all administrative law
standing tests. For general surveys of federal standing tests see A. BicKEL, THE LEAST
DANoRous BRANCH: TBE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLmcs 1-33, 116-25 (1962); L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMImSTRATrvE ACTION 459-545 (1965); J. NowAX, R. ROTUNDA
& J.N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CoNsnTIoNAL LAW 69-83 (1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTnrrlONAL LAW 79-114 (1979). For examples of other administrative law standing tests see
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)("tester" standing); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974Xtaxpayer standing); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(third-party standing); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer standing).
6. In Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, the Court warned that
"[gleneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such." 397 U.S. at 151. More
recently, the Court stated that:
"standing" is not a term used for its precision. As it is most commonly understood,
standing embraces both constitutional and prudential limitations on a federal court's
exercise ofjurisdiction. So used, it normally measures the quality of the interest asserted
by a private plaintiff in obtaining resolution of a particular dispute through the authority
of a court. As a threshold inquiry, we have required the plaintiff to show "some
threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action."... Further
generalization is hazardous.
Graddick v. Newman, 453 U.S. 928, 938 (1981) (citations omitted).
7. The zone of interests test was introduced in DataProcearing,397 U.S. at 152.
8. The Supreme Court deserves some of the blame for the confusion. Since introducing the
test in 1970, the Court has provided little guidance on its application; it has applied the test just
three times since 1970. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320-21 n.3
(1977); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400
U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam). The Court has mentioned the test at least seven additional times.
See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 473-75 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 n.6
(1979); Singleton v. Wulfl 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26,39 n.19 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 167, 176 n.9 (1974); United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686 n.13 (1973); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975).
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ability to prevent abuse of the judicial process and promote the
separation of powers.
I.

A.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST

Origin.

By introducing the zone of interests test in 1970, the Supreme
Court continued a trend liberalizing standing requirements for so-

called "competitors' suits," in which complainants challenge agency actions that allegedly injure competitors' ability to compete. 9 Before

1968, courts used a "legal interest" test to decide the standing of a party
challenging agency action. Under this test, a complainant could not
invoke the judicial power to protect an interest or right "unless the
right invaded [by agency action was] a legal right,--one of property,
one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or
one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." 10 Since competitive business interests are not interests of property, contract, or tort,

competitors had to show that their interests were, in fact, "founded on a
statute." 1 Accordingly, courts applying the legal interest test often en9. See, ,g., K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00-5, at 725 (Supp. 1970); Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposalsfor Legislative Refonm, 30
RUTrGERS L. REv. 863, 863-69 (1977).
The phrase "competitor's suit" was used in Data Processing to describe actions challenging
administrative action alleged to have caused competitive economic injury. 397 U.S. at 152. Use
of the phrase in this note assumes the same meaning.
10. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
11. Economic injury resulting from lawful competition was not a judicially protectable interest at common law. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 218 (Tucker
ed. 1803) ("it is no nuisance to erect a mill so near mine, as to draw away the custom, unless the
miller also intercepts the water. Neither is it a nuisance to set up any trade.., in neighborhood
or rivaship with another.").
In 1882 the Supreme Court incorporated this rule into federal law. See Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U.S. 166 (1881). InElerman a wharf owner sought to enjoin a railroad from building a
competing wharf. The Court held that:
The only injury of which [the wharf owner] can be heard in a judicial tribunal to complain is the invasion of some legal or equitable right. If he asserts that the competition of
is, that it does not abridge or impair any
the answer
him,
damages
company
the railroad
such
right. If
he alleges
that the
railroad
company
is acting beyond the warrant of te
law, the answer is, that a violation of its charter does not of itself injuriously affect any of
his rights. The company is not shown to owe him any duty which it has not performed.
Id at 174.
The Court explained its rationale for extending the common law rule to administrative action
in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). First, it acknowledged separation of powers
considerations: "[j]udicial restraint of those who administer the Government's purchasing would
constitute a break with settled judicial practice and a departure into fields hitherto wisely and
happily apportioned by the genius of our polity to the administration of another branch of Government." Id at 127-28. The Court then presented a more practical consideration:
Courts should not, where Congress has not done so, subject purchasing agencies of Government to the delays necessarily incident to judicial scrutiny at the instance of potential
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gaged in time-consuming statutory analyses to ascertain whether the
statute invoked by a competitor actually protected the asserted eco12
nomic interest.
The Supreme Court eased standing requirements for competitors
in 1968. In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co. the Court stated that:
[Competitive injury provided no basis for standing in... [previous
cases] simply because the statutory and constitutional requirements
that the plaintiff sought to enforce were in no way concerned withprotecting against compef'tive injuy. In contrast, it has been the rule
... that when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect
a legilativepurposetoprotecta competitive interest, the injured com13

petitor has standing to require compliance with that provision.
Thus after Hardin a competitor had to show only that a statute reflected a legislative purpose to protect the competitor's interest, a more
liberal standing barrier than the legal interest test.
The Court liberalized competitor standing further by introducing
the zone of interests test inAssociation ofDataProcessingService Organizations v. Camp1 and Barlow v. Collins.t 5 In Data Processing, an
association of data processors and a data processing corporation challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency permitting national
banks to provide data processing services to their customers and to
sellers, which would be contrary to traditional governmental practice and would create a
new concept of judicial controversies. A like restrait appliedto purchasing by private
business wuId be Wsel),condenwed as az intolerablebusiness handicap.
Id at 130 (emphasis added).
For an analysis of when an interest is "founded on a statute," see L JAFEE supra note 5, at
501-31.
12. For examples of the Supreme Court denying standing under the legal interests test see
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884
(1955) (denying standing to utility companies competing with federally funded power programs);
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (denying power company standing to
enjoin municipalities from receiving grants and loans to start competing business); Alexander
Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930) (denying standing to warehouse owners challenging ICC order requiring railroads to remove prejudicial freight rates).
13. 390 U.S. 1,6 (1968) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Previous cases that the Court
classified as "in no way concerned with protecting against competitive injury," id, were Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939);
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U.S. 166 (1881).
Previous cases reflecting "a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest" were Chicago v.
Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Alton R.R. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15
(1942); Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924); see also supra note 12.
Ten years before HardA the Court foreshadowed the Hardin-Data Processing liberalization
by stating in response to the government's assertion that "a party has no right to complain about
lawful competition," that a competitors "standing could hardly depend on whether or not it is
eventually held that [the challenged action] can lawfully operate." Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1958).
14. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
13. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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other banks.' 6 The complainants claimed that the ruling violated several statutes that protected them from the type of competitive injury the
ruling would cause.' 7 In Barlow, tenant farmers receiving funds under
the Food and Agriculture Act of 196518 made similar allegations of
economic injury. They alleged that a change in statutory interpretation
by the Secretary of Agriculture deprived them of funds and bargaining
power wiih merchants in violation of the Food and Agriculture Act.' 9
The lower courts in Data Processing and Barlow denied standing
to the complainants; 20 the Supreme Court reversed. Acknowledging
the lower courts' reliance on the legal interest test and the statutory
16. The ruling stated that "[incidental to its banking services, a national bank may make
available its data processing equipment or perform data processing services on such equipment for
other banks and bank customers." Comptroller's Manual for National Banks 3,500 (Oct. 15,
1966), quoted in DataProcessing 397 U.S. at 152.
17. One of the statutes relied upon, 397 U.S. at 155, was the Bank Service Corporation Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964). It read in pertinent part: "No bank service corporation may engage in

any activity other than the performance of bank service for banks." Id
The complainants also sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section 702

states that "a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial relief
thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
18. 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (Supp. IV 1968).
The Court explained the change:
The upland cotton program incorporates a 1938 statute, § 8(g) of the Soil Conservation
and Domestic Allotment Act, as amended, 52 Stat. 35 and 205, 16 U.S.C. § 590h(g),
thereby permitting participants in the program to assign payments only "as security for
cash or advances to finance making a crop." The regulation of the respondent Secretary
of Agriculture in effect until 1966 defined "making a crop" to exclude assignments to
secure "the payment of the whole or any part of a cash * * * rent for a farm." 20 Fed.
Reg.6512 (1955). Following passage of the 1965 Act, however, and before any payments
were made under it, the Secretary deleted the exclusion and amended the regulation
expressly to define "making a crop" to include assignments to secure "the payment of
cash rent for land used [for planting, cultivating, or harvesting.]" 31 Fed. Reg. 2815
(1966).
Barlow, 397 U.S. at 160-62 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
19. The Act required the Secretary to provide safeguards to protect the interests of tenants. 7
U.S.C. § 1444(d)(10) (Supp. IV 1964), quoted in Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164.
20. The lower court opinions in DataProcessing exemplify the confused state of competitor
standing before DataProcesing. The district court, for instance, focused on whether the statutes
conferred a specific privilege on the data processors. The court held that economic injury owing
to competition is not a legal right and that "neither the National Banking Act nor the Administrative Procedures Act are statutes conferring any specific privilege on plaintiffs." 279 F. Supp. 675,
678 (D.Minn. 1968), at~'d, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd,397 U.S. 150 (1970).
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the logical nexus standing test
that was promulgated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), after the district court decided the
case. The court denied standing without considering the APA, and by dismissing reliance on the
Bank Service Corporation Act as being "misplaced." 406 F.2d 837, 839, 843 n.12 (5th Cir. 1969),
rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). By applying Ras.' "taxpayer" standing test, the court failed to obey
the Supreme Court's instruction that standing tests are context-dependent. See supra notes 3-5
and accompanying text.
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analysis that the test required,2 1 the Court stated in Data Processing
that "[t]he 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different." The Court then replaced the legal interest test with
the zone of interests test.23
As outlined in DataProcessing,the zone of interests test is a twopronged inquiry. The court must determine: (1) whether the complainant adquately alleges an injury in fact;24 and (2) whether the alleged injury is to an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.25 By adding the word "arguably" to the prior test, the Court
both liberalized standing requirements for competitors and made
standing a threshold test rather than a detailed examination of alleged
legal interests. 26
B. Development.
Although the zone of interests test is readily verbalized, the courts
have had much difficulty applying it. They encounter two fundamental
problems: (1) how to apply the test properly; and (2) when to apply the
test.
21. DataProcersingwas not the first Supreme Court opinion to notice that the legal interest
test often confused standing inquiries with the merits. See Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
22. DataProcesskg, 397 U.S. at 153. The Court rejected the district court's concern over
"specific statutory privileges," holding that the statutes invoked "do not.. . protect a specified
group. But their general policy is apparent; and those whose interests are directly affected by...
interpretation of the [statute] are easily identifiable." Id at 157.
The Court also specifically rejected three examples of "legal interest" standing that were
mentioned in dicta by the court of appeals. The court of appeals stated that a complainant must
do more than merely allege unlawful competition to have standing:
[A] plaintiff may challenge alleged illegal competition when as complainant it pursues 1)
a legal interest by reason of public charter, 2) a legal interest by reason of statutory
protection, or 3) a "public interest" in which Congress has recognized the need for review of administrative action and plaintiff is significantly involved to have standing to
represent the public.
Data Processing,406 F.2d at 842-43. The Supreme Court emphasized its concern for limiting
standing tests to threshold inquiries by discarding the first two of the court of appeals' examples,
saying its concern for "the existence or nonexistence of a legal interest is a matter quite distinct
from the problem of standing" DataProce.tng,397 U.S. at 153 n.1. The Court also rejected the
court of appeals' third example, private attorney general standing, as inapplicable to the present
case. Id
23. DataProcessing,397 U.S. at 153. By implication, the Court also replaced the Hardn test.
See =upra note 13 and accompanying text.
24. Id at 152.
25. Id at 153.
26. The Court emphasized its intent to change competitor standing in Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam) (reversing decision denying standing to travel agents to
cnallenge an order of Comptroller of Currency allowing banks to provide travel services).
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1. How to apply the test. The Supreme Court has offered little guidance on how to apply the zone of interests test. Moreover, the Court
has itself evidenced confusion when applying the test. 27 For instance,
in the 1971 case Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, an association of investment companies and several individual companies challenged a
regulation issued by the Comptroller of the Currency that authorized
national banks to operate investment funds.2 8 The Supreme Court, relying on DataProcessing, granted standing. The Court held that "[tihe
injury to the [investment companies] . . . is indistinguishable" from
that in Data Processing.29 The Court reasoned that:
[W]e concluded [in DataProcessing]that Congress had arguably legislated against the competition that the petitioners sought to challenge, and from which flowed their injury. We noted that whether
Congress had indeed prohibited such competition was a question for
the merits. In the discussion that follows.. . we deal with the merits
of the petitioners' contentions and conclude that Congress did legislate against the competition that the petitioners challenge. There can
be no real question, therefore, of the petitioners' standing.... 30
Thus the Supreme Court apparently found it simpler to decide the merits than to resolve the threshold question of standing.
The lower courts have generally done a poor job of applying the
test. In most cases, the court merely states that the complainant satisfies
the test.3 1 In other cases, the court decides the case on another ground
27. Even in Data Processing and Barlow the Court was unclear. In Data Processing, for

instance, the Court quoted an extensive lower court analysis of legislative history and then stated
that "[w]e do not put the issue in [the lower court's] words, for they implicate the merits. We do
think, however, that [the statute] arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it." 397 U.S. at 156. In Barlow, the Court held that the complainants were "clearly
within the zone of interests protected by the [statute]" because "[i]mplicit in the statutory provisions and their legislative history is a congressional intent that the Secretary protect [their] interests .... " 397 U.S. at 164.
28. The regulation authorized national banks "to invest funds held in the capacity of managing agent in a collective investment account, 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(3) . . .. [and] allowed the
Comptroller to approve collective investment of such funds in manners other than those expressly
provided by Regulation 9, 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(cX5)." Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 274 F. Supp.
624,628 (D.D.C. 1967) (footnotes omitted), rev'donothergrowudrsub nom National Assoc. of Sec.
Dealers v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83 (1969) (per curiam), re'dinpart, vacatedinpart,401 U.S. 617 (1971).
29. 401 U.S. at 620.
30. Id at 620-21.
31. See, ag., Wilmington United Neighborhoods v. HEW, 615 F.2d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1981); Hollingsworth v. Harris, 608 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978);
Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 817 (3d Cir. 1970); Tucker v. Hardin, 430 F.2d 737 (Ist Cir.
1970); Alschuler v. HUD, 515 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (N.D. l. 1981), aff'd, 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.
1982).
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even though the zone of interests test clearly applies. 32 Still other
courts apply the test by examining "objectives and obvious purposes," 3 3 by considering only the allegations of the complaint,34 or by
deciding whether it "may be reasonably argued" that the asserted inter-

ests are protected.

5

2. When to apply the test. The courts are also confused about when

the test applies. The Supreme Court has used the test in just two
contexts: 36 competitor suits and challenges to agency actions that cause
"'aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational'"
injuries
("noneconomic" suits). 37 Owing to the Court's intention to keep standing tests context dependent, 3s applying the zone of interests test in con32. See, ag., Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 941 n.3 (5th Cir.
1982); Shiffier v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 1977); Port of N.Y. Auth. v. United States,
451 F.2d 783, 785 n.4 (2d Cir. 1971).
33. Dialysis Center, Ltd. v. Schweiker, 657 F.2d 135, 138 (7th Cir. 1981).
34. Nash v. California, 613 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1980).
35. National State Bank v. Smith, 591 F.2d 223, 233 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
36. This note focuses on cases in which a statute creates the plaintiff's cause of action. The
wording ofthe test, however, mentions constitutional guarantees. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. The courts remain relatively inactive in cases involving "constitutional guarantees."
While explaining how the zone of interests test applies to noneconomic interests, the DataProcessing Court stated that "[a] person or a family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment
values sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause." 397 U.S. at 154. In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Conm'n, the Court
used the zone of interests test while examining a complainant's standing under the Commerce
Clause. 429 U.S. 318, 320-21 n.3 (1977).
The rationale for applying the test to both spiritual and competitive business interests is the
same when complainants invoke a constitutional guarantee as when they invoke a statute; neither
interest is legally protectable absent written law. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Cou, however, appears unconcerned with the courts' failure to apply the test in
constitutional cases. In fact, several recent phrasings of the test by the Court do not even mention
constitutional guarantees. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 n,6
(1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976). But see Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 473-76 (1982).
37. After developing the second prong of its competitor standing test, the Court stated that
the asserted "interest... may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as economic values. We mention these noneconomic values to emphasize that standing may stem from
them as well as from... economic injury. . . ." Data Procesing, 397 U.S. at 154. In other
words, if a complainant adequately alleges harm to a noneconomic interest, standing must be
"founded on a statute." See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686 n.13 (1973).
The Court's treatment of the zone of interests test when noneconomic injuries are alleged has
primarily concerned the constitutional prong:
[P]alpable economic injuries have long been recognized as sufficient to lay the basis for
stan
....
Thus, neither DataProcessing nor Barlow addressed itself to the question, whichhas arisen with increasing frequency.. ., as to what must be alleged by
persons who claim injury of a noneconomic nature to interests that are widely shared.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
38. See mpra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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texts other than competitor or noneconomic suits may be improper. 39
Nevertheless, lower courts have applied the test in other contexts,40 including cases involving the exclusionary rule,41 grand jury oaths,42 condemnation proceedings, 43 and an attorney's contingency fee
agreement. 44 Other courts have applied the test to complainants in
civil rights actions, 45 antitrust cases,46 and private suits. 47 Courts have
39. Moreover, the courts do not always apply the test in competitor suits. For example, at
least five of the federal courts of appeals have limited their inquiry to injury in fact in cases
brought by unsuccessful bidders for government contracts. See Airco, Inc. v. Energy Research &
Dev.Admin., 528 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1975); Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v. United States, 514
F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1975); Hayes Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 864 (1975); William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 485 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1973);
Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973); see also Spencer,
White & Prentis, Inc. v. EPA, 641 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (2d Cir. 1981). The test used by these courts
originated in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit before the Supreme Court
introduced the zone of interests test. See Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
At least one court of appeals applies the zone of interests test in the same context. See Cincinnati Elecs. Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080, 1083 (6th Cir. 1975). Another court, although
deciding standing under the injury in fact test, also applied the zone of interests test. Merriam v.
Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973). Finally, one court of appeals
has reserved judgment on which test to apply. Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. United States, 641
F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (2d Cir. 1981).
40. See generally Hasl, Standing Revlsited-The Aftermath of DataProcessing, 18 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 12, 22-39 (1973) (examples of early extensions of the tests scope by the lower courts).
Some courts even confuse the test's fundamentals. See, ag., Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 768 (10th Cir. 1980) (relying on old legal interest test), cer. denied, 450 U.S.
1050 (1981); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1386-91 (10th Cir.
1980) (relying on old legal interest test); Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228,
236 n.21 (8th Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs "fail to satisfy the 'zone of interests' facet of the constitutional

test of standing") (emphasis added), cert.denied,424 U.S. 966 (1976). Acevedo v. Nassau County,
500 F.2d 1078, 1083-84 (2d Cir. 1974) (applied as constitutional test); Gibson & Perin Co. v.
Cincinnati, 480 F.2d 936, 942 (6th Cir.) (used a geographical zone), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068
(1973); Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982, 990-93 (D. Mont. 1981) (considered apart
from prudential concerns).
41. United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218, 1222-23 (6th Cir. 1972).
42. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Unger, 532 F. Supp. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
43. Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1977).
44. Smith v. South Side Loan Co., 567 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1978).
45. Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1207-08
(8th Cir. 1981); White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1981);
Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 625 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Ross v. Allen,
515 F. Supp. 972, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); McCarther v. Camelot Inn, 513 F. Supp. 343, 347 n.6 (E.D.
Ark. 1980).
46. See, eg., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1232-36 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 893 (1981); Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975); see aso Davis
& Pratt, Civil Procedure, 1982 DEr. C.L. REV. 287, 298-300 (Sixth Circuit use of the test in antitrust cases and its subsequent abandonment). The Supreme Court recently acknowledged the use
of the zone of interests test in antitrust cases but did not discuss its validity. Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S.CL 2540, 2547 n.12 (1982).
47. See, ,g., Spector v. L.Q. Motor Inns, Inc., 517 F.2d 278, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1975); Herpich
v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 (5th Cir. 1970). Compare American Postal Workers Union v. In-
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even applied the test to a defendant48 and to the government. 49
II.

THE MAJOR CRITICS OF THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST AND

THEIR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES

A. Brennan-Wite.
In DataProcessing and Barlow, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
White, concurred in the result but wrote a separate opinion in which he
dissented from the use of the new test.50 Justice Brennan found three
major faults with the test. First, he thought that both the language of
the test and its method of application were ill-defined.5 ' Second, Justice Brennan recognized "a disquieting similarity" between the new test
and the "legal interest" test's tendency to reach the merits.5 2 Third, he
argued that even if the test does not reach the merits, "it serves only to
determine whether the challenged agency action is reviewable . . . in

cases where there is no express statutory grant of review to members of
[the complainant's] class. And, if this is so, it has no place in the deter53
mination of standing."
Although he has apparently retreated from this position,54 Justice
Brennan suggested dropping the zone of interests test and requiring
only that the complainant meet the constitutional standing limitationinjury in fact.55 He asserted that "[t]he objectives of the Article III
standing requirement are simple: the avoidance of any use of a 'federal
court as a forum [for the airing of] generalized grievances about the
dependent Postal Sys. of Am., Inc.,'481 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1973) (denying standing and refusing to

apply the test), cert. danissed, 415 U.S. 901 (1974) Wth National Assoc. of Letter Carriers v.
Independent Postal Sys. of Am., Inc., 470 F.2d 265, 270-71 (10th Cir. 1972) (granting standing
under the test); see also 19 VILL. L. REv. 507 (1974).
48. Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 652 F.2d 1152, 1155-56 (3d Cir. 1981).
49. United States v. Lewisburg Area School Dist., 539 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1976).
50. DataProcessing, 397 U.S. at 167 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting).
51. Justice Brennan askedWhat precisely must a plaintiff do to establish that "the interest sought to be protected
...
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute"?
How specific an "interest" must he advance?... When, too, is his interest "arguably"
within the appropriate "zone"? Does a mere allegation that it falls there suffice?
Id at 177.
52. Id (emphasis supplied).
53. Id Justice Brennan warned that the Court's failure to separate standing from reviewability and the merits would risk uninformed, poorly reasoned decisions that may result in injustice.
Id at 176. At least two courts have expressly included inquiries into reviewability as part of the
zone of interests test. Fentron Indus. Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300,
1304-05 (9th Cir. 1982); Santex Dairy v. Bergland, 591 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1979). See genera!fy R. FwDLEY & D. FARBEa, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES & MATEIALS 73-92 (1981) (three
out of four cases on "reviewability" only discuss standing).
54. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
55. 397 U.S. at 171 (emphasis supplied).
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conduct of government

....

"-56

Therefore, courts should require

only injury in fact because the Court "discarded the notion of any additional requirement when we discussed standing solely in terms of its
constitutional content. ... By requiring a second, nonconstitutional
step, the Court comes very close to perpetuating the discredited requirement that the challenged governmental action invaded one of his
57
legal interests."
B. Davis.
In 1977 Professor Davis declared that the Supreme Court's "benign neglect" of the zone of interests test since its introduction had
made the test extinct. 58 Since 1977, however, the Supreme Court has
mentioned the test several times. 59 Professor Davis responded in 1982,
accentuating the widespread confusion surrounding the test:
"[s]ometimes [the zone of interests test is the law] but most of the time
it is not, and a criterion for determining when it is the law is completely
absent." 6 He also advised that "[s]omething resembling the zone test
may often be sound," 6 1 but lower courts should not blindly follow the
62
test.
Professor Davis criticizes four aspects of the test. First, he argues
that the phrases "to be protected" and "to be regulated" are analytically faulty. 63 The phrase "to be protected," according to Professor
Davis, "ignores the need for continuing common-law protection of
some interests," thereby hindering the development of new common
law rights; 64 if the courts can only acknowledge rights "to be protected"
by statute or constitutional guarantee, they lose their ability to protect
common law rights. On the other hand, Professor Davis thinks the
phrase "to be regulated" is too restrictive because all parties regulated
in fact should have standing. 65
56. Id
57. Id at 169.
58. Davis, Standing 1976, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 69, 81 (1977). More recently two other legal
scholars labeled the test "effectively abandoned by the Court." Spears and Sanford, Standing to
AppealAdminitrativeDec&ions in Texas, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 215, 228 n.100 (1981).
59. See supra note 8.
60. K DAvIs, supra note 9, § 22.02-11, at 347 (Supp. 1982). See infra notes 124-37 and ac-

companying text for this note's "criterion."
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

L
Id
Id
Id
K.

DAvis, supra note 9, § 22.02-11, at 351 (Supp. 1982).
at 352.
§ 22.00-3, at 711-12 (Supp. 1970).
at 711. But see infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
DAvis, supra note 9, § 22.00-3, at'711-12 (Supp. 1970). But see infra note 85.
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Second, Professor Davis criticizes the zone of interests test as being

contrary to previous case law.6 Third, Professor Davis considers the
test "cumbersome, inconvenient, and artificial." 67 He observes that inquiring into zones of interest usually requires courts to examine legislative history, which is inappropriate because "standing is a highly
' 68
practical [question] that calls for quick and clear answers.
Finally, Professor Davis argues that the zone of interests test is
"contrary to the congressional intent" underlying the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 69 To establish this point, he examines the legislative history of section 702 of the APA, the section that covers standing to challenge agency actions.70 Professor Davis notes that both
congressional committees on the judiciary decided that section 702
"confers a right of review upon any person adversely affected infact by
agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute."'71 Next
he points out that the words "in fact" were added after "adversely affected" and that the words "by agency action" followed "affected in
fact."72 This shows, he argues, that "the words 'within the meaning of
any statute' [do not] modify 'adversely affected.' ,,73 Therefore, the
zone of interests test contravenes the congressional intent underlying in
the APA by allowing "within the meaning of any statute" to modify
66. See K. DAvmS,
ra note 9, § 22.00-3, at 712-16. The only Supreme Court case Professor
Davis discusses is American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). In
that case, a school in the "business of healing diseases and ailments of the human family," Id at
96, challenged a fraud order issued against it by the Postmaster General pursuant to a statute. See
i at 100 n.l. Professor Davis states that "[t]he School's standing was so clear that the Court did
not discuss it. Yet.. ., the interest the School was asserting was not within the zone of interests
... , and therefore the School would lack standing." K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 713. Lower court
cases mentioned by Professor Davis include Morton Navigation Co. v. FMC, 405 F.2d 796 (9th
Cir. 1968); Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966); and First Nat'l Bank
v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965). But see hnfra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
67. K. DAvIs, supra note 9, at 716-19.
68. Id at 716. Professor Davis concludes:
Aside from the awkwardness and inconvenience of applying the Court's test, is not the
question of who should have access to a court's processes more likely to be answered
satisfactorily if a court is free to decide on the basis of what it deems to be the needs of
justice?
Id at 719.
69. K. DAvIS, supra note 9, at 719-22.
70. See supra note 17.
71. K. DAvIs, supra note 9, at 720 (emphasis added), quoting SENATE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 752, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945), reprintedin LEOIsLATVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINSTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1946) [hereinafter cited as LtaOISLAtIVE
HISTORY]; HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, H.R. REP. No.

1980, 79th Con&, 2d Sess. 42 (1946), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 276.
72. K. DAvIS, smpra note 9, at 720.
73. I1d; see also Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CH. L. REV. 601, 619-20
(1968).
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"adversely affected."'74 Not surprisingly, Professor Davis finds the "in-

75
jury in fact" test preferable to the zone of interests test.

C. Marquis.
Professor Marquis criticizes the zone of interests test for requiring

trial courts to "examine the fine and shadowy gradations between what
is arguably protected and what is actually protected.

'76

He therefore

does not believe that courts should make separate inquiries into standing, reviewability, and the merits in a given case. According to Professor Marquis, a defendant will usually present the court with the distinct

questions of standing, reviewability, and cause of action in a single motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure.77 He advocates removing the distinctions between standing,
and addressing questions of proreviewability, and cause of action
78
tected interests in one inquiry.
74. K. DAvIs, supra note 9, at 720-21; see also Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424
F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But see infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
75. K. DAvis, supra note 9, at 726. Professor Davis also suggests an alteration to make the
zone of interests inquiry a useful tool:" A person whose legitimate interest is injured in fact should
have standing unless congressional intent is discernible that the interest he asserts is not to be
protected." Id (emphasis deleted); see also id at 352 (Supp. 1982). This alteration is just a verbose method of saying "arguable," but Professor Davis' rephrasing is in accordance with the
method of application suggested by this note. See Inf-a notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
76. Marquis, The Zone ofInterets Component of the FederalStanding Rues: Alive and Well
After All?, 4 U. ARx. LrrrE RocK LJ.261 (1981).
77. Professor Marquis states that "Rule 12(b). . . virtually guarantees this by limiting a
defendant to a single motion to dismiss assigning all.of the grounds for dismissal which he wishes
to advance." Id at 285. But #f.FED.R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) (a defense of failure to state a claim may
be made in any pleading permitted, or at the trial on the merits).
78. Professor Marquis' alternative resembles an earlier suggestion. See Albert, supra note 1.
Professor Albert argued that "[w]hether seen as a standard of arguable claims or as a preview of
the merits, zone of interest standing appears to serve no intelligible function." Id at 496. He
suggested that:
The proper initial inquiry is into a litigant's legal interest under principles of claim and
not merely arguable presence in a zone. In view of familiar procedural motions for testing claims, neither a standard of arguable claims nor preview of protective intent is a
helpful substitute for the determination of legal interest at an early and appropriate stage
of a lawsuit .... In short, zone of interest standing is not a screen that serves any
purpose that is not better served by the requirements of protected legal interest as part of
a claim for relief.
Zd at 497.
Professor Marquis also suggests "eliminating any theoretical distinction between the tests applicable in determining the existence of an implied statutory right of action against governmental
and against private defendants." Marquis supra note 76 at 286. In other words, Professor Marquis think the zone test should apply in contexts other than administrative law.
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A DEFENSE OF THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST

A. A Response to the Critics.
1. Brennan-White. Justice Brennan's opinion in Data Processing
and Barlow faulted the zone of interests test for three reasons. The
first--that its terms are ill-defined--is a valid criticism, evidenced by

the current confusion in the lower courts. 79 This problem, however,
does not mandate abandonment of the test. If the test is fundamentally

sound, definitional problems can be alleviated.80

Justice Brennan's second criticism---that the test is too similar to

the legal interest test-is less valid. Owing to the nature of the issue
involved, the zone of interests test's tendency to reach the merits cannot
be eliminated completely. Although the standing inquiry and the analysis of the merits serve different purposes, they address the same basic
issue-protection under the statute sued upon. 8 ' When a complainant
must sue under a statute to assert a legally protected interest, a standing
82
inquiry must examine this issue if it is to serve its purpose.
Both Justice Brennan and Justice White have apparently rejected
their third criticism--that nonconstitutional standing tests are unnecessary; Justice White applied the zone of interests test in 1977 without
questioning its validity.8 3 Similarly, Justice Brennan acknowledged
that standing involves nonconstitutional elements: "standingis a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant to
create an Art. III case or controversy, or at least to overcomeprudential
limitations on federal court jurisdiction ...
,8 4
2. Davis. Professor Davis's first criticism of the zone of interests
test-that it hinders the courts' ability to protect common law rightsillustrates the confusion that results when courts and scholars ignore
79. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 110-37 and accompanying text.
81. This characteristio-examining the asserted interest--has been criticized for failing to
limit the test's inquiry to the party. In Raft . Cohen the Court stated that "the fundamental
aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court
and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1967). The Court retreated
from this position in Wanh . SeM4,:: "Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the
plaintifs contention that particular conduct is illegal, ... it often turns on the nature and source
of the claim asserted." 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); see in'ira note 109 and accompanying text.
82. In such contexts the courts must examine the source of the cause of action--the statute-to prevent abuse of the judicial process and to promote the separation of powers, which are the

prudential concerns of administrative law standing, see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
Through such examination the courts can determine whether the purposes of the standing tests are

fulfued.
83. Justice White wrote the Boston Stock Exchange opinion discussed supra at note 8.
84. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-40 n.18 (1979) (latter emphasis supplied).
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the context-dependent nature of standing 8 5 The zone of interests test

applies only when a complainant must invoke a statute to protect an
injured interest.8 6 Common law rights, however, are legal interests that

do not require a statute for judicial protection. Complainants seeking
redress for an injury to an interest protected at common law need only

adequately allege that interest, and a court will know that a protectable
interest is involved. Therefore, the zone of interests test has no effect

on the courts' ability to protect common law rights when applied in
proper contexts.87
85. Professor Davis's first criticism also claimed that a "to be regulated" standard is analytically faulty because any party regulated in fact should have standing. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text. This argument has considerable merit. Under the zone of interests test actual
regulation should beprimafacle evidence of an interest being arguably within the zone of interests, in which case the second prong of the test requires the same finding as the first-injury in
fact. But this criticism does not expose a fault in the test. In fact, by including "to be regulated"
in the zone test, the Supreme Court virtually assured standing to parties "regulated in fact" for the
reason mentioned above. Before the zone of interests test, courts were able to deny standing to
such complainants more easily. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 36; infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
87. Professor Davis's criticism reflects his tendency to ignore the context-dependent nature of
standing tests. For example, he criticizes the Supreme Court's failure to use the test in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1979), or in Bryant v. Yellen, 447
U.S. 352 (1980). In reference to Duke Power, Professor Davis wrote that "the Court has even
discussed a two-prong standing test, without mentioning the 'zone' test." K. DAvis, supra note 9,
§ 22.02-11, at 347 (Supp. 1982). His criticism fails for two reasons. First, Duke Power's two-prong
test concerned Article III standing, it did not address nonconstitutional standing requirements
such as the zone of interests test. See 438 U.S. at 80-81. Second, the complainants challenged the
constitutionality of an act undar the Fifth Amendment, asserting property interests. Id at 69.
Such interests are legally protected without the protection of written law. See infra notes 132-33
and accompanying text.
In reference to Bryant v. Yellen, Professor Davis accuses the Court of "flagrantly violating the
test." K. DAvIs, supra note 9, at 348. Bryant, however, involved the standing of parties who were
adversely affected by an agency limitation on irrigation and who had intervened in the litigation.
By not applying the zone of interests test in Bryant, the Court apparently refused to extend its
scope to "intervenor standing." See generaly Hasl, supra note 40, at 29-30, and sources cited
therein (discussing the issue of the test's applicability to intervenors). The Court's refusal to apply
the test to intervenors accentuates the prudential concerns behind the test. Since the litigation had
already commenced, the concerns over abuse of the judicial process and separation of powers
were mitigated, and the need for the zone of interests test disappeared.
Professor Davis's interpretation of a third Supreme Court opinion also reflects his failure to
acknowledge the context-dependent nature of standing. He interprets Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), as "the all-time high water mark of helpfulness" in application of the test. K. DAVIS, supra, note 9 at 347. But the passage he quotes--the plaintiff "must
assert his own legal interests, rather than those of third parties"-did not describe the zone of
interests test; the footnote at the end of the passage stated that "It]here are other nonconstitutional
limitations on standing to be applied in appropriate circumstanes ... See, eg., Simon . Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976)," and restated the second prong of the
zone of interests test. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 100 n.6 (1979).
Gladstone merely established that its facts were not an "appropriate circumstance" for the zone of
interests test.
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Professor Davis' second criticism--that the test is unintentionally
contrary to prior case law-ignores the Supreme Court's intent to use
the zone of interests test as a continuation of the liberalizing trend in
standing requirements "where statutes are concerned. ' 88 Rather than
including the test in this trend, Professor Davis compares the test with
approaches taken in a 1902 Supreme Court case and in several lower
court decisions.8 9 The Data Processing opinion, however, expressly
recognized and approved the effect that the zone of interests test would
have on prior law.90
Professor Davis's third criticism--4hat the test is cumbersome, inconvenient, and artificial-is in one sense accurate; the courts have indeed had trouble applying the test. Such criticism, however, does not
mandate abandonment of the test. Rather, the primary cause of any
cumbersomeness, inconvenience,, and artificiality in the application of
the test is misunderstanding by the courts. Thus, alleviating Professor
Davis' third concern merely requires refinement of the test.9 '
Finally, Professor Davis argues that the test contravenes the APA
because section 702 mandates an injury in fact test rather than a nonconstitutional standing test such as the zone of interests. Professor
Scott, however, has observed that "[o]ne might expect a change of such
dimensions to be commented upon amidst some controversy in the
course of enactment. It comes as a surprise, therefore, to find that the
sole support for this somewhat unnatural parsing.

. .

is a single sen-

tence, buried in the committee reports .... " 92 The Attorney General's statement in the legislative history that APA section 702 reflected
existing law supports Professor Scott's position that Congress did not
intend a drastic change in standing requirements.93
Clearly, Congress did not enact APA section 702 to confer standing on every party adversely affected by agency action. Moreover, the
injury in fact test is an unacceptable standing test for contexts in which
the zone of interests test applies.94 The injury in fact test fails to incor88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

DataProcessng 397 U.S. at 154. See supra notes 9-26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 66.
DataProcesing,397 U.S. at 154-55.
For this notes refinement see infra notes 110-37 and accompanying text.
Scott, Standing hr the Supreme Cow--A FzactaonalAnaiy~SI, 86 HARV. L Rnv. 645, 659

(1973).
93. SENATE COMM. ON THE JuDICIARY, APPENDIX TO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT
REGARDIo REvISED CombnrEE PRINT OF OcroBER 5,1945, S. REP. No. 75Z 79th Con&, 1st
Sess. 7 (1945), reprinedin LEOISLATrVE HIsTORY, supra note 71, at 224,230. This statement belies
Professor Davis's injury in fact alternative since the "legal interest" test was the existing law. See
spqra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
94. Notably, Justices Brennan and White seem to have rejected the injury in fact alternative.

See supmra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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porate any prudential considerations of standing. 95 Without an additional nonconstitutional step, the injury in fact test therefore would
preclude courts from considering prudential concerns 96 such as separa97
tion of powers and abuse of the judicial process.
3. Marquis. Professor Marquis' suggestion of combining all in-

quiries concerning allegedly protected interests is also an unacceptable
alternative to the zone of interests test. As the Brennan-White opinion
in Data Processing and Barlow warned, a confusion of standing, reviewability, and the merits unnecessarily increases the potential for

badly reasoned decisions denying justice. 98 All justiciability doctrines,
including standing and reviewability, are complex "rules of self-restraint" that depend on judicial discretion for proper. application.9 9

Therefore, if doctrines such as standing and reviewability merge, their
specific purposes and rationales merge also, weakening distinctions and
requiring further dependence on judicial discretion for proper application. 100 The greater the discretion, the harder it becomes to predict results and to discern a court's reasoning. Additionally, each of these
doctrines serves a specific purpose, and to merge them would inevitably
sacrifice these purposes to some degree.10 '
95. Such concerns form the basis of standing tests. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982); see p
notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
96. Professor Scott contends that nonconstitutional tests are unnecessary and that "injury in
fact" should be the sole standing test. Scott, mpra note 92. He makes an economist's argument:
lost opportunity costs resulting from litigating trivial or frivolous claims serve the same purpose as
any standing inquiry designed to screen complainants for potential abuse of the judicial process.
He also suggests two categories of standing tests: access standing and decision standing. Professor Scott would use access standing to deny use of the judicial process to an entire "class of
claims" that meet the minimum constitutional requirements but are insufficient to invoke the judicial power. In contrast, decision standing would examine the proper scope of the judiciary in
public policymaking. He concludes, therefore, that, while "labels are not as important as results,"
id at 690, decisional standing should be dealt with by other justiciability doctrines owing to its
failure to focus on the complainant's "interest in the case." Id at 684. Two cases that seem to
contradict this theory are discussed below. See h'fra notes 120-28, 134-37 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 53.
98. The Supreme Court has described justiciability as a "concept of uncertain meaning and
scope." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). The Court went on to explain,
Standing is an aspect of justiciability and, as such, the problem of standing is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere injusticiability. Standing has
been called one of "the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law."
Some of the complexities peculiar to standing problems result because standing "serves,
on occasion, as a shorthand expression for all the various elements ofjusticiability." In
addition, there are at work in the standing doctrine the many subtle pressures which tend
to cause policy considerations to blend into constitutional limitations.
Id at 98-99 (citations omitted).
99. See DataProcezrng, 397 U.S. at 168-70 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring & dissenting).
100. See id at 170-74.
101. I'd at 176-78.
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B. An Argumentfor the Zone of Interests Test.

The zone of interests test serves a useful purpose when properly
applied. It prevents unwarranted judicial interference with executive
branch decisionmaking while allowing private complainants to obtain
redress for injuries in cases in which Congress "arguably"' 0 2 intended
to protect their interests. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumentha ' 0° 3 provides an example.
Tax Analysts involved a challenge to certain IRS regulations controlling domestic tax credits for foreign taxes.10 4 The individual plaintiff, owner of a domestic oil well, sued the Secretary of the Treasury to
enjoin enforcement of the regulations, alleging that the regulations allowed competing multinational oil companies larger tax credits than
they deserved under the Internal Revenue Code. 05 The court denied
standing because the plaintiff was not arguably within the zone of interests that the tax provision was intended to protect.'0
If the court had granted the plaintiff standing in Tax Analysts, it
would have put itself in the position of reviewing the decisions of the
executive branch. Although courts routinely engage in such review, it
seems prudent for a court to deny review when Congress did not even
arguably intend the statute to protect a given complainant. Although
judicious intermeddling might well result in "better law," there is no
reason to believe that the courts are in a good position to do the job of
the executive branch. In many cases in which the complainant could
not prove damages but would pass the injury in fact test, and thereby
qualify for injunctive relief, this unwarranted intermeddling is exactly
what would happen. As the Supreme Court recognized in Data
Processingand in Barlow however, when the complainant can arguably
assert that Congress intended for the statute to protect his interests, this
prudential justification gives way to the judicial duty to redress
grievances.

10 7

Thus, the zone of interests test represents a balancing of prudential
concerns grounded in the separation of powers.10 As the Court stated
in Warth v. Seldin:
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
Id at 134.
Id at 134-35.
Id at 143-44.
See supra note 27.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that:
Mhe zone test serves the purpose of allowing courts to define those instances when it
believes the exercise of its power at the instigation of a particular party is not congruent
with the mandate of the legislative branch in a particular subject area.
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Without such limitations-closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance--the courts would be
called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance
even though other governmental institutions may be more competent
to address the questions ....
...Essentially, the standing question in such cases is whether
the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests
properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiffs position a right to judicial relief.109

Thus, as long as the test can be applied with some degree of consistency, it should be retained.
IV.
A.

PROPER APPLICATION OF THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST.

How the Test Should be Applied.

Much of the controversy surrounding the zone of interests test is
the result of the courts' failure to apply the test properly. The primary
area of confusion is the role of legislative history.110 Ideally, because
the Supreme Court introduced the test to avoid reaching the merits
while deciding standing, only the words of the statute sued on should
be examined when applying the test. Realistically, deciding whether an
interest is arguably "protected or regulated" requires an understanding
of the law's purpose, which often requires resort to legislative history.
But extensive examination of legislative history defeats the test's intent
to keep standing a threshold inquiry. Such detailed analysis only confuses standing with the merits and wastes a court's time.III
The approach to the test used by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Tax Analysts strikes the appropriate balance in examining the legislative history. The Tax Analysts court
limited its standing inquiry to whether the complainant alleged an inBy its choice of language, the Supreme Court has indicated that the zone test is a
quite generous standard; on the other hand, the test is obviously meant to serve as a
limitation on those who can use the federal courts as a forum for grievances emanating
from agency action taken pursuant to a particular statutory mandate. These competing
considerations serve to frame the bounds of a court's discretion in applying the zone test.
The discretion of a court to deny standing on the basis of the zone standard is not undefined; the zone test limitation is grounded in Congressional action as embodied in statute.
Tax Ana/ysts, 566 F.2d at 140 (footnote omitted); see also supra note 11.
109. 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (footnote omitted).
110. See, eg., Copper & Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 679
F.2d 951, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the result); supra note 27.
111. Many courts have nevertheless engaged in such an analysis. See, e.g., Copper & Brass
Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 679 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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terest arguably protected by the statutory language alone.112 Legislative history became relevant to the court only if it expressed a clear
intent to protect or to ignore the asserted interest. 11 3 The court chose
its approach for three reasons: (1) to avoid prejudgment of the merits;
(2) to simplify the inquiry because of the improbability of the legislative history providing dispositive evidence; and (3) to preclude undermining the "generous nature" of the test.114
This approach effectively satisfies Professor Davis's concern over
the test being "cumbersome, inconvenient, and artificial' 1 5 while
retaining flexibility for the court. The approach provides a standardized procedure for comparing a complainant's asserted interest with the
statutory language alleged to protect that interest. It also preserves the
"generous nature" of the test by accentuating the word "arguably" and
by restricting the inquiry to the face of the statute. As the court reasoned, "[t]he 'arguable' language of the zone test thus serves to resolve
potential ambiguities in the legislative history [in favor of standing]
and obviates the need to consult [legislative history] in the same detail
16
as is done when the merits of the dispute are being resolved."'
Applying the Tax Anal.sts approach to that case and to the facts
of the Data Processing case illustrates the merit of the approach. In
Data Processng, competitors harmed by activities of the national
banks sued under a statute providing that "[n]o bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank
services ... .1117 The Tax Analysts court supplied its approach to
such a case: "if Congress had in general terms legislated against competition in a statute, it is not difficult to find that particular competitive
interests, which may not have been mentioned in the legislative history
... , are 'arguably' within the zone of interests" of the statute."18 The
data processors would therefore have standing to assert their particular
112. 566 F.2d at 142. The court also addressed the issue of which statutes are relevant in the
inquiry. It decided that the relevant statutory provision is "the [one forming] the basis for the
lawsuit" because "the statutory provision at issue ina given case.., frames the substantive issue
which a court will decide. .. ." Id at 140-41. To consider other provisions would confuse standing inquiries because of Congress' common intent "to accomplish a wide variety of economic and
social goals and purposes" in one act; "the possibilities for litigation would... be endless." Id at
141. The court qualified this approach by permitting extension of its inquiry to provisions sharing
"an identity of purpose." Id
113. "[W]e would expect to be informed by the parties if the legislative history contained clear
evidence of an intent either to allow the appellant's interests as a basis for standing or to deny
standing to a party in this position." Ad at 143 n.80.
114. Id at 141-42.
115. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
116. TaxAnystr, 566 F.2d at 142.
117. Data Procesing, 397 U.S. at 155.
118. TaxAnalys, 566 F.2d at 142 (footnote omitted).
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competitive interest because the statute sued on expressed a general intent to legislate against competition. 119
In contrast, Tax Analysts involved a competitor suing under a statute granting a tax credit for "any income.., taxes paid or accrued
.. .to any foreign country.... ,,120 The court held that the purpose
of the statute was clear on its face, being "to prevent the double taxa-

tion of any United States companies operating abroad."' 21 Accordingly, domestic competitive interests were in no way within the statute's
zone of interests because there was no general intent to legislate against
competition.12 2 Thus, the test can be readily applied as long as the
court confines itself to the statutory language and its arguable
implications.123
B.

When the Test Should be Applied.

The controversy surrounding the zone of interests test is also partially the result of courts applying it in inappropriate circumstances.
Each standing test applies only in certain contexts;1 24 the zone of interests test is no different.
The Supreme Court's opinions provide guidance as to when the
test should apply. First, the test applies in competitor suits, when the
complainant adequately alleges economic injury caused by agency action, as in Data Processing. 2-5 The test also applies to complainants
alleging noneconomic injury to "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" interests.' 6 Neither competitive economic injuries nor aesthetic, conservational, and recreational interests are legally protected
119. The Supreme Court reached the same result in less convincing words, apparently relying
on a lower court opinion that examined the merits. See supra note 27.
120. 26 I.R.C. § 901(bX1X1976).
121. Tax.Analyj&, 566 F.2d at 143.
122. The court also described and rejected a "reverse zone of interests analysis" under which
complainants "could argue that they fall within the zone protected by negative implication of the
statutory provision." Id at 144.
123. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has had trouble following this
approach. In 1981 the court examined legislative history and subsequent congressional commentary and stated that it did not believe its inquiry conflicted with the TarAnalysts opinion. Control
Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283, 294 n.21 (D.C. Cir.), cer. dem'ed, 454 U.S. 881 (1981); see
supra note 113. In 1982 the court's short opinion in a competitors suit focused on legislative
history. Copper & Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 679 F.2d 951
(D.C. Cir. 1982). A concurring opinion questioning whether the court's method of inquiry was
appropriate indicates that the court may begin to reemphasize the Tax Analysts approach. Id at
concurring in the result).
953-55 (Ginsburg, J.,
124. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
125. DataProces.ng, 397 U.S. at 152.
126. See .mpra note 37.
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rights in the abstract. 27 Such unprotected interests require a particular
written law for legal protection. 28 The zone of interests test merely
ensures that complainants asserting such interests have, at least, an arguable claim to legal protection under the statute on which suit is
brought.
Thus, the test should apply in suits against the government in
which the complainant must rely on a statute for legal protection. 129 In
many cases Congress passes vague statutes that create rights unknown
at common law. In such cases the zone of interests test serves to circumscribe the use of judicial power to a lesser extent than the legal
interests test that it replaced. Conversely, in suits concerning well established rights the test should not apply. In such cases, the rights of
the complainant are so well defined that application of the test would
be mere a formality.
Many courts, however, apply the test in contexts in which it is inappropriate, especially in administrative law cases.' 30 Apparently,
these courts assume that "within the meaning of a relevant statute" refers to the basis of the offending agency action; because all administrative action depends on a statutory grant of authority, they conclude that
the test applies to all administrative law cases. This conclusion is erro13
neous. Standing inquiries examine complainants and their status, l
not the basis of the defendant's action. Whether the zone of interests
test applies, therefore, depends on whether the complainant must inyoke a particular statute to protect its asserted interest.
The cases provide numerous examples of lower courts applying
the test in improper contexts. In Robinson v. Knebel, for instance, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit improperly applied the test to
127. See smpra notes 36-37.
128. Justice Frankfiuter stated this principle succinctly:

A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge governmental action of a sort that, if
taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts ....
Or standing may be based upon an interest crealedby the Constitution or a statute. But

if no comparable common-law right exists and no such constitutional or statutory interest has been created, relief is not available judicially.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-

ring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
129. Several courts have extended the test's scope beyond the application suggested here. See
Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d 413, 421 (3d Cir. 1974); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 450 F.2d
199, 210 n.6 (3d Cir. 1971Xen banc), cer-. demied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972). Although the zone of
interests test may well be useful in cases involving private defendants, such as antitrust cases, see
spra notes 46-47 (authorities cited), consideration of such extension of the test is beyond the

scope of this note.
130. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
131. See spra note 3 and accompanying text.
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landowners challenging the condemnation of their land. 132 The complainants asserted a property right protected by common law, eliniinating the need to invoke a statute.1 33 The statutes that they sued under
served only to force an agency to comply with its terms; the statutes did
not provide the sole basis for legal protection of the particular interest
asserted.
Committee For Auto Responsibility v. Solomon 134 exemplifies an-

other improper extension of the zone of interests test. In Solomon the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit required complainants alleging physical health injuries to satisfy the test.1 35 Although the case could have been dismissed for lack of standing under
other tests, 36 the zone of interests test was invoked even though it did
not apply in that context; physical health is a legally protected interest
even without a statute.13 7 Again, the complainants in Solomon merely

sued on the statute to establish the impropriety of the agency action,
not to establish a legal interest.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has warned that "[g]eneralizations about
standing ... are largely worthless as such."1 38 Federal courts must
therefore regard standing tests as context-dependent threshold inquiries. Failure to do so merely creates confusion and unpredictability.
The current status of the zone of interests test illustrates the results of
courts blindly applying specific standing tests.
The confusion and unpredictability surrounding the test can be
mitigated if courts adhere to certain fundamental principles. First, it
applies only in contexts in which the complainant must rely on statutory law for legal protection of its asserted interest. Second, the test
132. 550 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1977).

133. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
134. 603 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

135. The complainants alleged that an agency's failure to charge commercial parking rates to
federal employees caused them health and conservational injury. Id at 997-98.
136. In a recent attempt to clarify distinctions between constitutional and nonconstitutional
standing inquiries, the Supreme Court stated that "Art. III requires... that the injury 'fairly can
be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."' Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 474 (1982) (citations omitted). Since the injuries, if any, resulting from the incremental increase in air and noise pollution caused by the lower parking rates would not be redressed by a
favorable decision, standing could have been denied on this ground--especally given the apparently frivolous nature of the action.
137. See, ag., Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d
1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
138. Data Proceoting,397 U.S. at 151; see mupra note 6.
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does not require extensive statutory analysis or examination of legislative history. Third, the test should be used to grant standing liberally. 139 Finally, it is a nonconstitutional test that is irrelevant whenever
Congress has expressly granted standing in the statutory language. 140
Kept within these contours, the zone of interests test protects the judiciary from suits brought by complainants Congress never intended to
protect in a given statute.
SanfordA. Church

139. The Court does seem to be contricting access to the judicial process, but it is doing so
through the constitutional requirement, the first prong of the zone of interests test. See Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 471-76 (1982).
140. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,500-01 (1975). Given that Congress cannot reduce standing below the constitutional requirement, it is interesting that the Supreme Court apparently has
chosen to constrict standing through interpretation of the injury in fact requirement rather than
tnroug6 the zone of interests test.

